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Graham: Graham: Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS:
ARE ALL BETTS OFF?
PublicEmployees Retirement System v. Betts'

Employee benefits comprise a substantial portion of the average
employee's compensation.2 Such benefits are especially important to
older employees because of the more immediate nature of retirement
and the greater need for health and disability benefits associated with
the aging process.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 3 was
enacted to protect employees in all aspects of the employment relationship but it specifically exempts employee benefit plans from that

1. 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
2. Chen, The Growth of Fringe Benefits: Implications for Social Security,
104 MONTHLY LAB. Rsv. 3, 5 (1981). A report by the United States Department

of Labor projects that the percentage of employee benefits of an employee's
overall compensation will rise from 15.8 percent in 1980 to 37.8 percent in the
year 2055. Id.
Actual and Projected Distribution of Total Compensation
Between Cash Payroll and Fringe Benefits
YEAR

CASH PAYROLL

FRINGE BENEFITS

1950
1960
1970
1980

95.0
92.2
89.7
84.2

5.0
7.8
15.8
15.8

1990
2000
2020
2035
2055

80.6
77.5
71.5
67.4
62.2

19.4
22.5
28.5
32.6
37.8

Actual:

Projected:

Id (Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; projections furnished by the Office
of the Actuary, Social Security Administration).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623()(2) (1988).
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protection if certain requirements are met. The meaning and scope of
this exemption is analyzed
and redefined in Public Employees Retire4
ment System v. Betts.
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1978, June M. Betts was hired by the Hamilton County Board
of Mental Health and Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
(HCMHRDD) as a speech pathologist.5 Betts became unable to perform
her job satisfactorily in 1984 due to health problems. As a result, she
voluntarily accepted a less demanding position with HCBMRDD at a
lower salary.6 A year later, Betts again
became unable to perform
7
satisfactorily because of health problems.
Consequently, HCBMRDD gave her the choice between voluntary
retirement within ten days or a forced medical leave of absence. The
former would provide her with a monthly income of $139.40 and medical
benefits, while the latter would leave her without pay or medical
benefits." On June 3, 1985, at the age of 61, Betts chose to "voluntarily
retire.1,9
Upon her retirement, Betts received $158.50 in age and service
retirement benefits.'
She also filed an application for disability
retirement benefits to which she attached a physician's report indicating
her permanent physical disability."
This application was denied
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 145.35, which provides in part:
"Application for disability retirement may be made by a member..., provided the member has at least five years of total service
credit and has not attained age sixty and is not receiving disability
benefits under any other Ohio state or municipal retirement program.'02 Thus, Betts was denied disability retirement benefits despite

4. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
5. Betts v. Hamilton County Bd., 631 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (S.D. Ohio 1986),
affd, 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id at 1202. Sections 145.33 and 145.34 of the Ohio Revised Code
Annotated provide that age and service retirement benefits are paid to those
employees who at the time of their retirement (1) have at least 5 years of service
credit and are at least 60 years of age; (2) have 30 years of service credit; or (3)
have 25 years of service credit and are at least 55 years of age. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 145.33-.34 (Anderson 1984 & Supp. 1988).
11. Betts, 631 F. Supp. at 1201.
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 145.35 (Anderson Supp. 1988). The requirehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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her physical disability for the sole reason that she was 61 years old at
the time of retirement.
If Betts had been allowed to take disability retirement, her monthly
income would have been more than double the amount paid under the
age and service retirement benefits.'3
This disparity would have
occurred because of a 1976 amendment to the Public Employees
Retirement System (PERS) statutory scheme. The amendment dictates
that a retiree shall receive disability retirement payments in an annual
amount no less than thirty percent of the retirant's final average
salary. 14 Betts' final average salary was $14,260.00.5 Therefore, if
she had been eligible for monthly disability retirement payments, she
would have received thirty percent of $14,260.00, or $355.02 per month.
Betts filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) shortly after her retirement. 6 She
also filed a suit for lost benefits and payment of attorney's fees arising
out of PERS and HCBMRDD's alleged violation of the ADEA.'7
The named defendants, HCBNMfDD and PERS, made three
arguments to the district court. First, they argued that since Betts had
"voluntarily" retired she was precluded from bringing an action. She
"voluntarily chose to retire instead of undergoing a medical examination
to prove the need for placing her on a medical leave of absence and
therefore, age was not a factor in the events giving rise to this litigation."' s Second, the defendants argued that even if the plan was
discriminatory, their actions fell under the statutory exemption provided
by section 623(f)(2) of the ADEA. 9 Finally, the defendants argued that
the disability retirement plan pre-existed the ADEA and therefore, it
was lawful.2'

ments for disability retirement payments have remained the same since 1959.
13. Betts, 631 F. Supp. at 1202.
14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 145.36 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
15. Betts, 631 F. Supp. at 1202.
16. Id at 1201.
17. Id at 1200. Betts alleged that PERS and HCRMRDD's refusal to grant
disability retirement benefits violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1982 & Supp. V
1987). Id More specifically, the violation was of section 623(a)(1) which states
that it is unlawful for an employer "to ... otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
18. Betts, 631 F. Supp. at 1200.
19. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1988)).
20. Id Defendant PERS independently asserted that it was not an
employer for purposes of the Act. The district court rejected this argument and
held that PERS was an employer because "it controls some aspects of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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While Betts's primary argument was HCRMRDD and PERS had
violated section 623(a) of the ADEA, she also responded to the defendants arguments. Betts asserted that the retirement plan is not
protected by the section 623(f)(2) exemption because the plan does more
than just reduce benefits, it precludes them altogether to persons of a
certain age.21 Next, Betts asserted that to be covered by the exemption, the plan must be justified by significant cost considerations. "[I]t
[must] cost no more to provide disability benefits to a sixty-one-year-old
employee than a twenty-five-year-old employee, provided both [have] the
same number of service years and final average salary."22
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted Betts's
motion for summary judgment. It held that the disability retirement
plan was discriminatory on its face and therefore, it violated the
ADEA.' The district court then addressed the statutory exemption.
The court stated that for the defendant's plan to qualify for the
exemption, it must meet four criteria: 1) it must be the sort of "plan"
covered by the exemption; 2) it must be "bona fide," -whichmeans that
it exists and pays substantial benefits; 3) defendant's act must be in
observance of its plan; and 4) the plan must not be a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act.2 Adopting the EEOC regulations which
interpret the section 623(f)(2) exemption, the district court held that an
employee benefit plan could qualify for the exemption only if the agerelated reductions in benefits were justified by "significant cost
considerations."2 Indeed, the district court stated that "[t]he critical
factor in our determination of whether defendant's plan is the type 2of6
plan exempted is whether it is based upon age-related cost factors.
The court determined the PERS plan was not justified by cost consider27
ations and was not the "type of plan contemplated by the exemption.1
Thus, it was not entitled to protection under section 623(f)(2).' •

plaintiff's compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
at 1206.
21. 1i at 1204.
22. Id. Betts relies on the EEOC regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1988).
23. Betts, 631 F. Supp at 1203.
24. I&
25. Id. at 1204.
26. Id. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a) (1988) (legislative history of this
exemption provision indicates that its purpose is to permit age-based reductions
in employee benefit plans where such reductions are justified by significant cost
considerations).
27. Betts, 631 F. Supp. at 1204.
28. Id The district court did not address the issue of whether the plan was
a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Id at 1205.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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A divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
and adopted its reasoning as well.2 The Sixth Circuit agreed that the
plan was discriminatory and was not exempt under section 623(f)(2)
unless justified by age-related cost considerationsY° " Specifically, the
circuit court held that "[u]nder the Act, an age-based benefit plan which
denies disability retirement to older employees in favor of forcing length
of service retirement is unlawful unless it can be justified by a
substantial business purpose.3 1 In so holding, the circuit court
rejected a prior Supreme Court decision which had provided that a
discriminatory benefit plan need not be justified by any business
purpose. 2
Since neither HCBMRDD nor PERS submitted any
evidence of cost justifications or business purposes with respect to the
plan, the court of appeals affirmed.'
Defendant PERS appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held: A benefit plan is
entitled to the protection of the section 623(f)(2) exemption unless its
plan is "a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act." ' 4 Subterfuge
"
is defined as a "scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion. 3
Therefore, pre-Act plans cannot be subterfuges and post-Act plans
cannot be subterfuges unless they discriminate in a manner forbidden
by the substantive provisions of the Act. The burden of proof is on the
employee to prove intent to discriminate in the non-fringe benefit aspect
of the employment relationship.3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was enacted
by Congress in 1967.37 The Act itself sets forth its three primary
purposes: 1) promoting employment of older persons based on ability
rather than age; 2) prohibiting arbitrary discrimination in employment;
and 3) promoting resolution of age-based employment problems.3 The

29. Betts, 848 F.2d at 694-95.
30. Id. at 694.
31. Id, (emphasis added). The appellate court also relied primarily upon 29
C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1988) in reaching this conclusion. Id.
32. Id (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)).
33. Id34. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2858 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. V 1987)).
35. Id at 2861 (quoting McMann, 434 U.S. at 203).
36. Id. at 2860-66.
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
38. Id § 621(b).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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ADEA has made discrimination in hiring, firing, and compensation on
the basis of age unlawful.3 9
Despite the broad scope of the ADEA, Congress did see fit to
provide some exemptions to the provisions of the Act. Section 623(f)(2)
is the exemption in issue in Betts and reads in pertinent part: "It shall
not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization to observe the terms of... any bona fide employment benefit plan
such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a
40
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act.,
To comply with section 623(f)(2) and qualify for exemption from the
anti-discriminatory provisions of the Act, a plan must meet three
requirements. First, it must be a bona fide employee benefit plan.
Second, the employer must be acting in observance of the terms of the
plan. And third, the plan must not be a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act.41 It also has been established that this provision
is an affirmative defense, therefore, the burden of proof is "on the one
seeking to invoke the exception to show that every element has been
clearly and unmistakably met."42 In other words, the burden of
proving these elements is on the employer.
43
This section has been referred to as the "pension plan exception.,

39. Section 623 specifically provides that it is a violation for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (Supp. V 1987).
40. Id § 623(0(2); see also id. § 623(f)(1), (3) (additional statutory exemptions to the Act).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1988); see EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252,
257 (2d Cir. 1982).
42. 9 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a) (1988); see Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d at 257; accord
Betts, 848 F.2d at 692; EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480, 1488 (3d
Cir. 1988); see also Potenze v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 804 F.2d 235, 237
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 725 F.2d. 211, 223 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984). See
generally Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of ProceduralJustice,34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1257-61 (1981).
43. Comment, FederalAge Discriminationin Employment Act: The Pension
Plan Exception After McMann and the 1978 Amendments, 54 NOTRE DAME L.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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A review of the legislative history will reveal the intent behind the
exemption.
As initially proposed, the ADEA contained no provision dealing with
age discrimination in employee benefit plans. The concern of several
senators prompted an amendment to section 623(f)(2) which would allow
employers to consider cost differentials when formulating employee
benefit programs for older employees. 44 Without such a provision, the
senators believed that employers would be discouraged from hiring older
workers because of the additional expenses they would incur when older
workers were placed in existing retirement plans. 45 Potentially, an
older worker would qualify for retirement benefits much sooner than a
younger employee. The additional expense would result because an
older employee's contribution to the plan might not be as significant as
a younger employee simply because of time. Legislators feared that
employers "faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased
4
premiums" might "look for excuses not to hire older workers., 1
Congress designed the final draft of the amendment to alleviate this
dilemma. The amendment's sponsor, Senator Jacob Javits, explained
that with the provision "an employer will not be compelled to afford
older workers exactly the same pension, retirement or insurance
benefits as younger workers and thus employers will not, because of the
often extremely high cost of providing certain types of benefits to older
workers, actually be discouraged from hiring workers."4' The legislators felt the amendment was consistent with the stated purpose of the
Act of promoting the hiring of older workers.'
The intent of the legislature to allow cost differentials in benefit
plans for older workers in order not to discourage employers from hiring
them was adopted by the EEOC in their interpretive regulations. "The
legislative history of this provision indicates that its purpose is to
permit age-based reductions in employee benefit plans where such

REv. 323, 323 (1978).
44. Hearingson S. 830 Before the Subcomm. on Laborof the Senate Comm.
on Labor andPublic Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1967).

45. See 113 CONG. REc. 31,254-55 (1967) (remarks by Sen. Javits).
46. Age Discriminationin Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830 and S.
788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public

Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
47. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254-55 (1967).
48. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 2213, 2217; cf. Comment, Age Discrimination
in Private Pension Plans, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 67 (1981)(section 4 ()(2)
provision is inconsistent with the primary purpose of the act-ending arbitrary
age discrimination).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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reductions are justified by significant cost justifications."4 9 Specifically,
the regulations required age-related cost justifications fQr a plan not to
be considered a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the] Act."'
For an employer to prove that its benefit plan is justified by cost
considerations and therefore not a subterfuge, it must insure that "the
actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an older
worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker,
even though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of
benefits or insurance coverage."'" The cost data produced by the
52
employer must be "valid and reasonable."
Before 1978, case law resulting from the pension plan exemption
almost exclusively focused on the issue of involuntary or mandatory
retirement plans and whether they are protected under section 623(f(2).
Circuit courts reached conflicting decisions on this issue 6 3 and the
Supreme Court eventually resolved it in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann.' In McMann, the Court held that the defendant's retirement plan, which resulted in involuntary retirement upon the attainment of age sixty, was exempt from the provisions of the Act under
section 623(f)(2) because the plan was bona fide and not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the Act.55 Congress immediately found displeasure with the McMann holding. Thereafter, it soon passed amendments
to the exemption which specifically prohibited involuntary retirement
plans.5
The 1978 amendments ended the long debate over the lawfulness
of involuntary retirement programs. Nevertheless, as one commentator
noted, "The 1978 amendments... [left] an important question of

49. 9 C.F.R. § 1625.10(a)(1) (1988).
50. Id § 1625.10(d). Section 1625.10(d) states in part: "a plan or plan
provision which prescribes lower benefits for older employees on account of age
is not a 'subterfuge' within the meaning of section 4(f)(2), provided that the
lower level of benefits is justified by age-related cost considerations." Id
51. Id. § 1625.10 (a)(1).
52. Id.
53. Certiorari'was granted in McMann to expressly resolve the conflict
between the holdings of the Fifth Circuit in Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974), and the Fourth Circuit in McMann v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976). The Court also noted a conflicting
decision in Zinger v. Blanchett, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977).
54. 34 U.S. 192 (1977).
55. Id. at 203.
56. 9 U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1967)). The
1978 amendments added the following phrase to section 623(0(2): "and no such
seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual." Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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interpretation... unresolved."57 Employers can still grant unequal
benefits to older employees under plans that are not "subterfuges."'
The unresolved issue which courts faced after McMann involved the
59
proper interpretation to give to the subterfuge clause.

B. Pre-Betts Interpretationof Subterfuge
As previously stated, once a pension plan is determined to be "bona
fide,"' and the employer has acted in "observ[ance] of the terms,""1
then the plan's final hurdle is whether it is a "subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act." 2
The interpretation of the subterfuge clause was addressed first by
the Supreme Court in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann.'
In
MeMann, the defendant United Air Lines had established a retirement
income plan in 1941.'
In 1964, McMann, an employee of United,
voluntarily joined the plan. McMann's application form contained
language showing age 60 as the normal retirement age for participants
in his category. When McMann reached age 60, he was "retired" over
his objection. McMann brought suit under the ADEA. 65 The Court
addressed the definition of subterfuge in determining the availability of
the involuntary retirement provision. The Court's broad interpretation
provided that "subterfuge must be given its ordinary meaning" which is
'
a "scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion." 6

57. Comment, supranote 43, at 327.
58. 9 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
59. The other two components of section 623(f)(2) will not be fully discussed
in this Note because they were not issues in the primary case and they are
beyond the scope of this Note. For general information concerning these
components, see 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8 (1988); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b)(c)
(1988). See generally Reinhart, InterpretingSection 4((2) of the ADEA: Does
Anyone Have a "Plan"? 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1987).
60. Section 1625.10(b) states that a plan is bona fide "if its terms... have
been accurately described in writing to all employees and if it actually provides
the benefits in accordance with the terms of the plan." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(b)
(1988).
61. Section 1625.10(c) states that this requirement is meant to limit the
exemption to "otherwise discriminatory actions which are actually prescribed by
the.., plan." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(c) (1988). There must be "express provisions
to... provide lesser benefits to older workers." Id&
62. 9 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
63. 34 U.S. 192 (1977).
64. I& at 194.
65. I&
66. Id. at 203.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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Using this definition, the Court held that a plan established prior
to the enactment of the ADEA in 1967 could not be a subterfuge. 7 By
requiring a subterfuge to be a plan or scheme, the Court implanted the
element of subjective intent which had not been present in the previous
definitions. Applying this definition to the facts in McMann, the Court
reasoned that "[t]o spell out an intent in 1941 to evade a statutory
requirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a
remarkable prescience to the employer."6
Henceforth, plans established before 1967 could not be subterfuges even if they set forth
blatantly discriminatory practices. The Court also rejected any per se
rule requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose
behind the discriminatory practice to qualify for the exemption under
69
the subterfuge test.
After McMann and the 1978 amendments overruling it, confusion
developed about the proper interpretation for the subterfuge clause,
While purporting to overturn McMann, the 1978 amendments only
contained language pertaining to involuntary retirement with no
mention of the subterfuge clause.70 There was a verbal repudiation of
McMann's definition of subterfuge, but the amendments lack any
language expressing this congressional intent. 71 Therefore, courts have
been uncertain whether the amendments are meant to overrule
McMann in its entirety, or only as it pertains to involuntary retirement
plans. The McMann definition was only practical with respect to plans
adopted before 1967; it provided little guidance in interpreting post-Act
plans. In addition, the EEOC regulations interpreting section 623(f)(2)
set forth a system in which a discriminatory plan is a subterfuge unless
it can be justified by age-related cost considerations.72 These aspects
of the subterfuge clause are best explained by discussing them in
context with the circuit courts' interpretation of the clause since 1978.
Essentially, the five circuit courts addressing the subterfuge issue
have followed the interpretation set forth by the EEOC regulations.
They have required some type of cost-justification or business purpose
test for a plan not to be considered a subterfuge. 73 The Second Circuit

67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 9 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
71. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMw. NEWS 528, 529.
72. 9 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d) (1988). The only exception to this rule concerns
specific types of retirement plans such as employee contributions in support of
employee benefit plans. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d)(4)(i)-(iii) (1988).
73. Betts v. Hamilton County Bd., 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 2854 (1989); EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1988);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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was one of the first to address this issue. In Cipriano v. Board of
Education,74 the Second Circuit noted the importance of the 1979
regulations in interpreting section 623(f)(2). It noted that "[tihese
regulations, enacted after the 1978 amendments went into effect, clearly
assume that the 'subterfuge' requirement has continued vitality, and
seem to put a fairly heavy burden on the employer to justify any agebased distinctions in employee benefit plans on the basis of 'age-related
cost justifications."' 75 The Second Circuit noted that the 1978 amendments did not reverse McMann in its entirety.7" Despite this finding,
the circuit court ultimately held that an employer had to present "some
evidence that the plan is not a subterfuge... by showing
a legitimate
77
business reason for structuring the plan as it did.
The Third Circuit has been more willing to utilize the EEOC
regulatory interpretation with respect to benefit plans in existence after
the enactment of the ADEA in 1967. In EEOC v. City of Mt. Lebanon,'8 the Third Circuit was confronted with a disability retirement
plan adopted in 1973. The plan was allegedly discriminatory because:
1) it did not provide benefits until age sixty-five for those disabled
before age sixty; 2) it failed to provide benefits for five years for those
disabled between age sixty and sixty-five; [and] 3) it failed to provide
benefits until age seventy for individuals disabled between the ages
of sixty-six and sixty-eight.79
Because Mt. Lebanon provided a cost justification for these discriminatory provisions derived from insurance schedules, the district court
granted its motion for summary judgment.80

Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2038
(1988); Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986); Crosland v.
Charlotte Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 686 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982). Justice
Marshall also cited EEOC v. Bordens, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), in
this list in his dissent in Betts. The Borden's,Inc. decision, however, turned on
the fact that the plan contested there was not a "bona fide" plan. Id. at 1396.
But the Ninth Circuit recognized the applicability of the regulations to the
subterfuge clause in dicta. Id.
74. 85 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252,258 (2d Cir. 1982) (ruling
in McMann did not relieve all employers of obligations to prove valid business
purposes, especially with respect to pertinent parts of the plans adopted after
the ADEA).
78. 42 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1988).
79.. Id. at 1484-85.
80. Id. at 1485.
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On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes a subterfuge and whether the plan was a subterfuge. First, the
circuit court dismissed McMann's definition as exceedingly broad."' It
then turned to the legislative history of the provision. The Third Circuit
recited the intent of Congress as providing an incentive for employers
to hire older workers by allowing flexibility in benefit plans. "Thus, the
[section] 623(f)(2) exception was based upon the principle that employers
should be relieved of the obligation of providing older employees with
benefits equal to benefits for younger employees when it would be more
costly to do so."8 2 The Third Circuit believed the federal regulation
was consistent with congressional intent because it allowed employers
to reduce benefits to older workers when necessary "to achieve approximate equivalency in cost for older and younger workers."' The circuit
courts gave deference to the regulation because it was a "long-standing
and contemporaneous agency interpretation" that did not "lack support
in the statutory language or legislative history. '' 4
The decision in Mt. Lebanon, however, is different from the other
circuits because it requires that in addition to cost justifications for the
plan, the employer's subjective intent must be reviewed as well. 5
Thus, the circuit court held that the lack of cost justifications "may not
be conclusive if the employer can establish that it acted in good
faith."86 But the good faith element in no way relieved the employer
of the burden of producing cost data to prove a correlation between age
and costs.87
In Crosland v. CharlotteEye, Ear & Throat Hospital," the Fourth
Circuit reached a result similar to the Third Circuit's, but it did not
discuss the subjective element. The Fourth Circuit held that because
the 1978 amendments had not overruled McMann's interpretation of
subterfuge, plans predating the ADEA were not subterfuges. The
Fourth Circuit cited McMann in holding that a plan formed after the
ADEA was not a subterfuge if the employer could show a "business or
89
economic purpose" for the plan or its provision.

81. Id at 1488.
82. Id at 1489.
83. Id at 1493 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1) (1988)).
84. Id
85. Id at 1494.
86. Id.; see McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
87. Mt. Lebanon,842 F.2d at 1494. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated
the summary judgment. Id On remand, the court required Mt. Lebanon to
justify its plan in view of cost considerations and establish that it acted in good
faith. Id
88. 86 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 213.
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The remaining circuits following the EEOC regulations have
required the employer to show some type of cost justification for the
plan not to be considered a subterfuge.'
All of these circuits dealt
exclusively with post-Act plans or material provisions that had been
added to pre-Act plans after 1967. This allowed the circuits to minimize
the holding in McMann by limiting it to pre-Act plans.
Each circuit court faced with a plan enacted before the ADEA
consistently followed McMann and ruled that the plan was not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.9 '
An illustration of the courts' reasoning in these cases is found in
EEOC v. County of Orange.9 2 That case revolved around a benefit plan
established in 1951 which limited membership to employees under 35
years of age at the time of employment.93 The EEOC claimed that the
regulations interpreting the statute required the County to demonstrate
that the age restrictions were justified by cost considerations. It also
claimed that "both McMann's specific holding as to involuntary
retirement and its conclusion that a benefit plan predating the Act
cannot be a subterfuge" were overruled by the 1978 amendments. 94
The Tenth Circuit rejected both of these arguments. First, the
95
court held that it was not bound by the regulation's interpretation.
Second, it held that the 1978 amendments only applied to involuntary
retirement plans and that Congress presumptively "adopted McMann's
definition of subterfuge when it reenacted 4(f)(2) without amending the
subterfuge language."' Therefore, the County's plan adopted in 1951
could not be a subterfuge.

90. See Karlen v. City College, 837 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2854 (1989) (exemption requires employer "to prove a close
correlation between age and cost" and, if notproven, inference of age discrimination strong enough to defeat motion for summary judgment); see also Betts, 848
F.2d at 694 (held that 1978 amendments overruled McMann entirely, therefore
only way to disprove subterfuge was through cost-justification).
91. See EEOC v. Cargill, 855 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1988); accord EEOC v.
County of Orange, 837 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Maine, 644 F. Supp.
223 (D. Me. 1986), affd mem., 823 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1987); International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers Local 1139 v. Union Elec. Co., 585 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. Mo.
1984), affd, 761 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1985).
92. 37 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1988).
93. Id. at 421.
94. Id. at 422.
95. Id. at 422 n.2.
96. Id. at 422; see Cargill,855 F.2d at 686 (language of statute must be the
primary source of interpretation and the 1978 amendments only specific with
respect to involuntary retirement programs); see also EEOC v. Maine, 823 F.2d
542,- 545 (1st Cir. 1987) (bona fide employee benefit plan whose age-based
provision antedate the ADEA are per se exempt under 4(f)(2)).
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To recapitulate, prior to 1989, circuit courts addressing post-Act
plans or amendments to pre-Act plans left little room for doubt that agebased cost justifications were necessary to avoid the conclusion that
such plans were subterfuges to evade the purposes of the Act. Courts
recognized the continued validity of the McMann definition of subterfuge, but limited its application to plans pre-dating the Act. Courts
reasoned that this result was consistent with the purpose of the Act in
that one of its primary purposes was to encourage employers to hire
older persons. Employers were encouraged to do so still without facing
increased costs for benefit plans."
At the same time, the other
primary purpose of eliminating arbitrary age discrimination was served
by forcing employers to justify any discrepancies with specific agerelated cost data.'
The ability of employers to avoid penalties for
arbitrary discrimination was made a bit easier by some courts'
requirement of a subjective intent in addition to the absence of costjustifications.'
C. Betts' Impact on the Interpretation
of the Subterfuge Clause
The Supreme Court's decision in Betts is significant because it
overturns all prior circuit court decisions addressing post-Act plans and
invalidates the federal regulation that required a plan to have an agerelated cost justification to avoid being a subterfuge under section
623(f)(2).'" The Court's decision is especially important because it
redefines "subterfuge" with respect to post-Act benefit plans. 10 1 All
prior courts examining plans of this type followed the EEOC regulations
and required some type of cost-justification or business purpose to
disprove subterfuge.0 2 The Betts court, however, specifically holds

97. See supranotes 70-87 and accompanying text.
98. See supranotes 70-87 and accompanying text.
99. See supranotes 85-87 and accompanying text.
100. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2858-69. The Court also held that the phrase
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" set forth in
section 4(a)(1) does not encompass employee benefit plans. Id at 2866. To
conclude otherwise, "would render the § 4(f)(2) exception nugatory with respect
to post-Act plans." Id101. Id at 2862. Betts attacked the Ohio plan on the basis that disability
retirees automatically received a minimum of thirty percent of their final
average salary while disabled employees retiring after age sixty did not. This
provision of the plan was adopted in 1976. Id The Court held that McMann
did not "insulate" the plan from challenge in that McMann applies to acts
predating the ADEA. Id
102. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
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that the "the interpretative regulation construing § 4(f)(2) to include a
cost-justification requirement is... invalid."'0 3
The Court reached this conclusion by adopting the "plain meaning"
interpretation it had used in McMann. °
Despite the ten year
acceptance of the EEOC regulations, the Court stated that "this
approach... cannot be squared with the plain language of the
statute."'0 5 The Court continued by reasoning that the plain definition of subterfuge as a "scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice of evasion"
includes a subjective intent which is not considered
in the objective
16
nature of the cost-justification requirement. 0
Betts and the EEOC asserted that the cost-justification regulation
was "contemporaneous and consistent" with the interpretation of the
ADEA and was given by the agency responsible for the Act's enforcement. 10 7 Thus, the regulation should be given "special deference."'OF,
The Court rejected this argument for the same reason that it rejected
the regulation-the agency's interpretation was inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute.'
"[A]gency interpretations must fall
to the extent they conflict with statutory language."" 0 With regard
to this conclusion, the Court noted that although the "cost-justification"
first appeared in 1969, subsequent regulations impermissibly narrowed
"a nonexclusive objective test for employers" to an exclusive cost based
analysis."'
Betts tried to rely on the legislative history of the ADEA to show
congressional intent expressed during debates on the 1978 amendments.
She specifically cited remarks of Senator Javits and Representative
Warman that the conferees of the Conference Committee disagreed with'
MeMann, "particularly its conclusion that an employee .benefit plan
which discriminates on the basis of age is protected by section 4(f)(2)
because it predates the enactment of the ADEA." 112 The Court
disregarded this reliance by refusing to consider legislative history and
conclusively held3 that the subterfuge exemption could not be limited by
11
the regulation.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
(1981).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2865.
McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2863.

Id.
Id.

Id.; see EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600, n.17
Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2863.
Id
Id.
Id. at 2861 (quoting 124 CONG. Eec. 7881 (1978)).
Id at 2863-64. The Court also addressed whether a cost-justification

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 4

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

After invalidating the standing interpretation of the subterfuge
clause with respect to post-Act plans, the Court determined how an
employer claiming the exemption will be afforded protection in the
future. The Court held that a bona fide benefit plan is not a subterfuge
"so long as the plan is not a method of discriminating in other,
nonfringe-benefit aspects of the employment relationship."114 In effect,
the Court ruled that in addition to demonstrating disparate employee
benefits, a plaintiff employee would have to demonstrate some other
form of discrimination in the terms, conditions, or compensation of
employment in order to establish a violation. This holding broadens the
scope of the exemption and adds a subjective element to the subterfuge
clause not required previously with post-Act plans.
The Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that the existence
of the exemption is conclusive evidence that "not all age discrimination
in employment is 'arbitrary.""' 15 Therefore, Congress must have
intended to only eliminate "arbitrary" discrimination, and the pension
plan exemption is an area where discrimination is not arbitrary. Thus,
the Court looked to the substantive provisions of the Act to determine
the types of activities that Congress considers to be arbitrary."('
The Court supported its broad interpretation by examining the
legislative history of the Act and Congress' intent with respect to the
intended scope of the Act. It relied on Senator Javits's statement in
committee hearings that "'the age discrimination law is not the proper
place to fight the battle of ensuring 'adequate pension benefits for older
workers"' to show that "Congress envisioned a broader role" for the
exemption. 117 The Court also cited committee reports on the ADEA
in 1967 which state that the section 4(f)(2) exemption "serves to
emphasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by

requirement could be read into the provision of section 623(f)(2) which requires
the plan to be "any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement,
pension or insurance plan." Id. at 2865 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988)).
Two circuit courts have used this clause to limit the exemption to plans in which
all age-based discrepancies in benefits are justified by age-related cost
considerations. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 224 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); see also EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724
F.2d 1390,1396 (9th Cir. 1984). Since this interpretation was not the prevailing
view in prior case law, it is enough to note that the Betts Court rejected this
interpretation because it is "contrary to the plain language of the statute."
Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2864-65.
114. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2866.
115. Id. at 2865 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)).
116. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
117. Betts, 109 S.Ct. at 2867 (quoting 113 CONG. REc. 7076 (1967)).
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permitting employment without
necessarily including such workers in
118
employee benefit plans."
In an effort to show that its new definition does not render the
subterfuge clause a "dead letter," the Court gave some examples of the
types of employer conduct that are not protected by section 623(f)(2).
One example is a situation in which an employer reduces salaries for all
employees but substantially increases benefits for younger employees.
The Court stated that this "might give rise to an inference that the
employer was in fact utilizing its benefits plan as a subterfuge for agebased discrimination in wages, an activity forbidden by § 4(a)(1)." u 9
Additionally, Betts shifted the burden of proof from the employer
and placed it on the employee plaintiff.12° No longer is the exemption
an affirmative defense as previously established. Instead, the Court
interpreted it as a "description of the type of employer conduct that is
prohibited in the employee benefit plan context.' 12' This holding
substantially alters the legal burden of the employee in an age
discrimination case concerning benefit plans.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justices Marshall and Brennan,
concluded that the majority's opinion "immunizes virtually all employee
benefit programs from liability."'22 The employer will not be liable
though he is "unable to put forth any justification for denying older
workers the benefits younger ones receive, and indeed, even if his only
reason for discriminating against older workers in benefits
is his abject
2
hostility to, or his unfounded stereotypes of them.', 1
The dissent argued that any plan not justified by a business
purpose would "contravene the text and history of the [ADEA]."'2 4
The cost justification or business purpose justification is clearly set forth
in the legislative history of
the exemption and the long established
25
regulations interpreting it.'
The majority's plain meaning approach completely ignored the rules
of statutory interpretation which command that legislative history be

118. Id (quoting S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967)).
119. Id- at 2868.
120. Id
121. Id; see Robinson v. County of Fresno, 882 F.2d 444,446 (9th Cir. 1989)
(court upheld dismissal of complaint citing Betts for proposition that the
employee has the burden to show the plan was intended to serve the purpose to
discriminate in some non-fringe benefit aspect of employment).
122. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2869.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text; see also 29 C.F.R. §
1625.10 (1988).
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used to interpret an ambiguous statutory provision. 2 Consequently,
the majority "pauses not a moment on the provisions purposes or
legislative history."'1 27 The dissent found this especially ironic because
the majority's construction of the new interpretation of subterfuge
supposedly was based on legislative history. In the words of Justice
Marshall: "the business purpose interpretation fails because the plain
language of the statute does not command it, but the majority's
because the plain language of the statute does
interpretation succeeds
l
not preclude i.~g
The dissent also articulated three reasons why the legislative
history supports a cost-justification interpretation of subterfuge. First,
statements made by the sponsors of the exemption demonstrate that it
was "intended to protect benefit plans with economic justifications... and did not intend categorically to immunize benefit plans
from liability for unjustified discrimination."'" Second, the legislative
history cited by the majority to support its broad interpretation were not
isolated and not persuasive because they pre-dated the final amendment
to the exemption proposed by Senator Javits.'" Finally, the legislative history lacks any endorsement of the majority's interpretation of the
subterfuge clause.'31
III. ANALYSIS
The decision in Betts is faulty for several reasons but the primary
flaw is that it is blatantly inconsistent with the expressed statutory
purpose of the ADEA. In section 621(b), Congress specifically provided
that one of the purposes of the Act is to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.'3 2 By invalidating the regulations which

126. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2870
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2872.
129. Id. at 2873; see 113 CoNG. REc. 31,254-55 (1967) (statement by Sen.
Javits).
130. Betts, 109 S,Ct. at 2873.
131. Id., It should be noted that even if the legislative history did not
support a cost-justification requirement, the dissent would still adopt such an
interpretation. The regulations interpreting the provision have adopted a costjustification interpretation and the dissent indicated that courts should give
deference to "enforcement agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutory provisions." Id. at 2874; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). The statute also states that one of the
purposes of the Act is to promote the employment of older workers, however,
this purpose is arguably subordinate to the purpose of prohibiting arbitrary age
discrimination as evidenced by the very name of the Age Discrimination in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss3/4
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require cost-justifications of discriminatory benefit plans, the Court gave
employers free rein to arbitrarily discriminate on the basis of age in
benefit plans. This essentially completes the immunization process the
Court began in McMann when it held that pre-Act benefit plans could
not be subterfuges because there can be no intent to evade the purposes
of the Act." By holding that a post-Act employee benefit plan cannot
be a subterfuge unless the employee can show some non-fringe benefit
aspect of discrimination, the immunization process is complete.
The majority opinion is flawed also because, as the dissent points
out, it completely ignored the wealth of legislative history and interpretations of regulations provided by Congress and the EEOC. Consequently, its "plain meaning" interpretation is inconsistent with the
purpose of the exemption.
Legislative history, beginning in 1967, has supported some type of
cost justification before a plan will not be considered a subterfuge. The
original purpose for the exemption was to spare employers the burden
of incurring additional expense in benefit plans when hiring older
workers who would not be able to make the same contributions as
younger workers. In the words of Senator Javits, "The meaning of this
§ 4(f0(2) provision is as follows: An employer will not be compelled
under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension,
'1
retirement, or insurance benefits as he affords to younger workers."'
During the passage of the 1978 amendments, the managers of the
amendments and others repeatedly and specifically endorsed the
in
understanding that section 4(f0(2) only protected discrimination
1
benefit plans that were justified by cost considerations.
By ignoring the legislative history, the Court made a decision
contrary to the purpose of the exemption. Instead of relieving the
burden of additional expenses associated with hiring older workers, the
Court relieved the burden of all expenses.
The Court tried to convince itself that the new definition of
subterfuge will not render the provision completely useless. It even
went so far as to provide examples of situations in which a discriminatory practice in an employee benefit plan would be subterfuge because it
would result in discrimination in some other "non-fringe benefit" aspect
The Court stated that the exemption would not
of employment.' 1

Employment Act. Id
133. McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
134. 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967) (emphasis added).
135. See 124 CoNG. REc. 8,218 (1978); see also 124 CoNG. REC. 7,881 (1978)
(remarks by Rep. Hawkins that the "purpose of § 4(f)(2) is to encourage the
employment of older workers by permitting age-based variations in benefits
when the cost of providing benefits to older workers is substantially higher").
136. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2867-68.
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apply in a situation where the employer decreases benefits to all
137
employees, but then increases benefits to only younger employees.
The exemption would not apply because the result of these actions is to
discriminate with respect to age in a non-fringe benefit aspect of
employment." Using this test, if an employer just increased benefits
to younger employees and not to older employees, the exemption would
protect the employer because there would be no effect on the non-fringe
benefit aspect of employment. Thus, the discriminatory practice would
be protected regardless of whether there was cost justification for the
increase. It is very difficult to believe that the same Congress who
enacted the ADEA to protect older employers would allow the section
4(f)(2) exemption to be wielded by employers to implement discriminatory practices without any sort of justification.
Even accepting the Court's invalidation of the EEOC regulation and
its reversal of all the circuit courts addressing the subterfuge issue, the
new definition proposed by the Court is completely unacceptable. By
shifting the burden of proof to the employee and requiring her to prove
discrimination in both benefit plans and the non-fringe benefit aspect
of employment, the Court puts an insurmountable road block in front of
employees. In his testimony before the Senate Special Committee on
Aging, Christopher Mackaronis, former Senior Staff Attorney in the
Office of Legal Council at the EEOC, predicted that if the Betts
standards remain in effect, "Congress should anticipate the elimination
139
He
of almost all employee benefit litigation under the ADEA."'
explained that "[u]nder the Court's 'benefits discrimination plus'
formulation, prudent counsel will be forced to search for direct evidence
of an employer's 'intent' to discriminate in a nonfringe-benefit aspect of
employment prior to instituting litigations." 140 Because employers will
rarely announce an intention to discriminate in benefit plans as a
means of accomplishing some other unlawful objective, this type of
evidence will be extremely difficult to uncover.
The Court's interpretation and the EEOC regulation's interpretation of subterfuge are at opposite extremes. As previously discussed, the
Betts definition broadens the definition to protect even the most
discriminatory plans. The EEOC cost justification requirements are
arguably too restrictive because they only provide two methods by which
A possible compromise
employers can justify their benefit plans.'

137. Id. at 2868.
138. Id.
139. Testimony of ChristopherMackaronis: Hearingson S. 1511 Before the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging and the Labor Subcomm. of the Labor and
Education Comm., 101th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989).
140. Id.
141. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d) (1988) (cost comparisons and adjustments
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consistent with the statutory purpose of the Act and the legislative
purpose of the exemption might be some type of business justification
requirement. Employers who could not justify their discriminatory
benefit plan by age-related cost data would be allowed to prove a
legitimate business purpose for the practice. If the employer could meet
this burden, the plan would not be a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of the Act. This definition of subterfuge was adopted by several of the
circuit courts addressing the issue. 42
The best interpretation of subterfuge is the straight cost-justification requirement. It is consistent with the legislative intent for the
exemption and does not violate the statutory purpose of the Act by
prohibiting arbitrary discrimination. But it is only consistent if the
burden of proof is returned to the employer and the provision is treated
as an affirmative defense as originally intended. If the burden of proof
is left with the employee as the Supreme Court desires, the difficulty
associated with proving that a particular plan is not justified by cost
considerations would defeat the purposes of the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is presently a movement in Congress to overturn Betts.143
The battle to reverse Betts is led by the EEOC and several senior
citizens advocacy groups such as the American Association of Retired
Persons.'" The EEOC has particular interest in overturning Betts
because of thirty pending cases challenging the benefit plans as
unlawful under the ADEA. EEOC repreientatives have stated that
"[a]bsent quick remedial legislation,
half of these cases would have to
1 45
be dismissed in light of Betts.'

under section 4(f)(2) must be made on a benefit-by-benefit basis or on a "benefit
package" basis).
142. See Karlen v. City Colleges, 837 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2038 (1988).
143. Almost immediately after the decision was announced, S. 1511, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), and H.R. 3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), were
introduced to overturn the decision. The bills are identical and both seek to
restore the pre-Betts definition of subterfuge. If enacted, they would overturn
McMann and apply the cost-justification requirements to pre-Act plans as well.
144. See The Older Worker's Benefit Protection Act, 1989: Hearings on S.
1511 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Horace B. Deets, Exec. Director,
AARP).
145. EEOC Favors Action to Amend ADEA in Light of Betts Decision, 16
Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1694, 1994 (Sept. 25, 1989).
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Even if legislation does not overturn Betts, its impact may be
limited in practice by employee relations considerations.146 Because
the previous regulations have been in effect for twenty years, most
benefit plans having discriminatory effects are likely justified by agerelated cost considerations. If an employer began making changes in
benefits plans that discriminate against older workers, serious employee
relations problems could develop. A change in employment relations
could result in the passage of legislation to overturn Betts.
JENNIFER S. GRA-iAM

146. 5 WYATT, TnE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS Fuss 7 (1989).
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